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PROTECTING EMPLOYER INVESTMENT
IN TRAINING: NONCOMPETES VS.
REPAYMENT AGREEMENTS
BRANDON S. LONG
INTRODUCTION
In an economy with more and more opportunities for workers
who possess sophisticated skills and technical aptitude, American
companies must fight to recruit, train, and retain the market’s most
talented employees.1 Saddled with the challenge of competing for top
talent, employers frequently use noncompetition clauses
2
(“noncompetes”) in employment agreements to guard against
employee defections. These clauses have become increasingly popular
in recent decades and have been the subject of considerable
controversy and debate. At this debate’s core is often the question of
what specific employer interests should noncompetes protect. In
response to shifting market conditions that affect employer–employee
relationships,3 states continually reevaluate the degree to which they
choose to uphold these noncompetes.4
To take an example, Louisiana has recently re-assessed which
employer interests should be “protectable.” Historically, Louisiana
law rejected all contracts restraining anyone “from exercising a lawful
profession, trade or business of any kind,”5 but made an exception for
agreements by an employee “to refrain from carrying on or engaging
6
in” a business in competition with his employer (i.e., noncompetes).
Copyright © 2005 by Brandon S. Long.
1. See PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK 1–16 (1999) (discussing economic
factors driving change in employer–employee relations).
2. Traditionally, noncompete agreements restricted an employee from competing with an
employer within a specified geographic region and for a finite term after the employment period
ended. See generally Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 625 (1960) (defining noncompetition agreements and tracing the legal enforceability of
noncompetes throughout English and American law).
3. See infra notes 33–43 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(A)(1) (West 2003).
6. Id. § 23:921(C).
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7
In 2001, in its controversial Swat 24 decision, the Louisiana Supreme
Court interpreted this exception narrowly, holding that a noncompete
will be unenforceable if it restricts an employee from working for a
8
business competitor. In contrast, the court agreed to uphold
noncompetes that prevent an employee from starting his own
business.9 Thus, under Swat 24, companies could not restrict an
employee from working for an existing competitor but could prevent
10
an employee from opening a shop across the street. This ruling left
Louisiana employers with much less protection against their loss of
investment in employees. In dissent, Justice Chet Traylor mentioned
this concern, arguing that without broader enforcement of
noncompetes “employers can not [sic] afford to invest optimally in
11
product development or in their employees.”
In reaction to this holding, the Louisiana legislature statutorily
overruled Swat 24 in June 2003. To do so, it enacted a provision that
permitted enforceability of noncompetes against employees who are
“employed by a competing business, regardless of whether or not that
person is an owner or equity interest holder of that competing
12
business . . . .” In other words, the enforceability of noncompetes
was expanded to allow restrictions both from working as an employee
13
of a competing business and from opening one’s own business.

7.
8.

Swat 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So.2d 294 (La. 2001).
See Jennifer A. Faroldi, What’s Still Brewing in the 2003 Legislative Session?, LA. EMP.
L. LETTER, June 2003, at 4 (“[Y]ou currently can’t prevent former employees from working for a
competing business.”).
9. Swat 24, 808 So.2d at 296. The facts of the case are fairly straightforward. The employee
had been promoted by the employer, a construction company, to the position of production
manager, a status that required him to sign a noncompete agreement. The noncompete
agreement had stipulated that the employee would not “serve as an officer, employee, director,
agent or consultant of any business, which is in direct or indirect competition with” the
employer. Id. at 296–97. In striking down this contract, the court examined the legislative
records behind section 23:921 and concluded that the statute’s legislative intent demanded that
the exception in subsection (C) only applied to employees who establish their own competing
businesses, not to employees who chose to work for already-existing competitors. Id. at 302–07.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 313 (Traylor, J., dissenting).
12. 2003 La. Sess. Law Serv. 428 (West).
13. This tension between the legislature and the courts is common in the area of
noncompete law. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the state of Texas endured a similar conflict.
The Texas Supreme Court had interpreted the state’s noncompete statute narrowly, refusing to
enforce noncompetes against at-will employees. The Texas legislature followed this decision
with a law specifically including at-will employees under the purview of the noncompete statute.
For a detailed description of this conflict, see Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work:
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In the Louisiana House of Representatives debates regarding
this provision, a number of arguments were made in support of the
14
House Representative Jack Smith justified broader
bill.
enforceability of noncompetes by cautioning against the risk of an
15
unrestricted employee sharing trade secrets and customer lists. A
number of representatives also expressed concern that employer
investment in employee training might be squandered if companies
could not enforce noncompetes.16 Thus, they argued, Louisiana law
should be expanded to allow businesses to protect investment in
employee training through the enforcement of noncompete
agreements.17 This desire to protect employer investment in training
marks a considerable departure from the current law in many states.18
Louisiana is correct in recognizing the importance of protecting
an employer’s investment in training. Yet, this Note argues that using
a per se enforceability standard for traditional noncompetes to effect
this goal limits employees’ post-employment job prospects
disproportionately compared to what employers need to protect their
training investment. In contrast to traditional noncompetes,
repayment agreements offer a sensible alternative whereby an
employer’s level of protection moves in lockstep with the cost of, and
value derived from, the training. That is, repayment agreements more
closely approximate the degree of protection required to encourage
employer investment in training.
Part I of this Note discusses the increased importance of training
investment in today’s workforce and the need for judicial protection
of that investment. Part II traces both the policy arguments
supporting and condemning noncompetition agreements and the tests
courts commonly use to evaluate enforceability. Part III.A analyzes
training investment in the context of traditional noncompete

Disputes over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L.
REV. 721, 744–46 (2002).
14. La. House Chamber Proceedings Day 20, Discussion of House Bill 1770 (May 7, 2003)
(statement of Rep. Jack Smith), available at http://house.louisiana.gov/rmarchive/2003/
May2003.htm.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id. (“Look at the company. They’re going to make an investment in that individual,
they’re going to give him an education, they’re going to train him . . . and all they want in return
is ‘don’t compete against me for two years’ . . . . I think it’s a fair trade.”).
18. See infra Part III.A.
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agreements, and Part III.B argues that repayment agreements are a
more sensible alternative to traditional noncompetes.
I. TRAINING INVESTMENT IN TODAY’S ECONOMY
In the American workplace, investment in training is essential if
businesses hope to keep pace with competition. According to
Department of Labor research on the changing dynamics of the U.S.
job market,19 technological improvements continue to transform the
20
American workplace in dramatic fashion. Employers are constantly
looking for more efficient ways to manage their businesses as
technology and speed become critical to business success.21 As a
result, companies demand employees that are equipped to contribute
22
meaningfully in a fast-paced business setting. With technological
innovation accelerating in the twenty-first century, jobs will require
more sophisticated workers; “[t]he demand for ‘knowledge’ workers
across a wide spectrum of occupations is forecasted to increase.”23
Economic innovation will affect all jobs; certain technology-related
jobs, namely computer software and support specialists, network
systems analysts, and database administrators, will become more
abundant during the twenty-first century and will be especially
affected.24

19. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Strategic Plan FY 2003–FY 2008 (2003) [hereinafter
U.S. Dep’t of Labor Plan] (describing the changing American workforce and the Department’s
goals for improving labor conditions), available at http://www.dol.gov/_sec/ stratplan/main.htm.
20. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Report on the American Workforce 5 (2001) [hereinafter U.S.
Dep’t of Labor Report] (describing the twentieth-century innovations that have transformed
the American workplace, including “[c]ommunication devices, measuring devices, computer
controlled equipment, [and] the x-ray”), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/rtaw/
rtawhome.htm.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 6 (providing that men and women with college degrees earn almost two-thirds
percent more than those with only high school degrees). This study also reports that in the year
2000 the unemployment rate for individuals with only a high school degree approached 4
percent, whereas the rate for college graduates approximated only 1.5 percent. Id. at 193.
23. U.S. Dep’t of Labor Plan, supra note 19, at 3; see also U.S. Dep’t of Labor Report,
supra note 20, at 3 (“Over the course of the 20th century, the composition of the labor force
shifted from industries dominated by primary production occupations, such as farmers and
foresters, to those dominated by professional, technical, and service workers.”).
24. U.S. Dep’t of Labor Plan, supra note 19, at 4.
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Just as the need for technology-savvy employees grows, so does
25
the need for formal job training. Few would deny that the twentieth
century saw “[e]ducation play[] an important role in the advancement
26
of the individual worker, the workforce, and the economy.”
Employees rely on training opportunities as incentives for choosing a
particular line of work or a particular employer.27 According to one
study, 30 percent of those surveyed claimed that training
opportunities were an “extremely important” factor in choosing their
careers.28 Likewise, many large professional services firms advertise
29
their training opportunities to help recruit top talent. Just by visiting
a company’s Web site, one can discover the vast array of educational
courses available to its employees. One law firm, King & Spalding,
boasts “K&S University,” a formal educational curriculum designed
to offer attorneys professional development opportunities at all stages
of their careers.30 Broadly speaking, employees recognize that
education leads to marketability, marketability leads to professional
advancement, and professional advancement leads to personal
satisfaction.
With training becoming a necessity for anyone looking to
succeed in today’s workforce, how does one become trained? More
specifically, who should pay for this training? Obviously, formal
education plays a major role in helping individuals develop skills that

25. See id. at 3 (“Increasingly, the majority of jobs will need workers who have acquired
knowledge and skills via two-year colleges, vocational training, moderate to long-term on-thejob training, and real world experience.”).
26. U.S. Dep’t of Labor Report, supra note 20, at 6. See also U.S. Dep’t of Labor Plan,
supra note 19, at 41 (“Knowledge workers now account for a third of the American workforce,
outnumbering factory workers by two to one.”).
27. See Stone, supra note 13, at 722 (“Employees see the growth of their human capital and
the enhancement of their labor market opportunities as one of the benefits of the job. Jobs are
often evaluated and selected on the basis of whether and how much opportunity for learning
and skill enhancement are provided.”).
28. CAPPELLI, supra note 1, at 24. The same study found that 47 percent of workers
characterize their interest in professional development as “important.” Id.
29. Many company Web sites, and especially those of professional service firms, tout their
emphasis on employee training to help attract talented workers. See, e.g., AIG, Career
Development, at http://www.aig.com/careers/about_dev_frameset.htm (last visited June 19,
2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Bank of America, Team Bank of America, at http://
www.bankofamerica.com/teambank/index.cfm?template=tb_leaddev (last visited June 19, 2005)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal); McKinsey & Company, Broaden Your Career Options, at
http://www.mckinsey.com/aboutus/careers/undergraduates/broadencareeroptions/index.asp (last
visited June 19, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
30. King & Spalding LLP, K&S University, at http://www.kslaw.com/training/training.asp
(last visited June 19, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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will translate into success throughout their careers. Universities,
community colleges, and vocational schools, all typically paid for by
the employee/worker, provide a foundation of necessary occupational
competencies. Government programs also help support the
31
cultivation of the American workforce. Welfare programs and
subsidies created through legislation such as the Workforce
32
Investment Act allocate government dollars to assist primarily lowincome workers in attaining the job skills required to compete in
today’s workplace.
Most often, however, American companies accept the burden of
educating their own employees.33 This arrangement seems to work
well for both employee and employer. Few employees would disagree
that formal education provides the framework within which one
builds the expertise necessary to sustain a living. Marketable
professional skills, such as how to interpret a company balance sheet
or how to weld together two pieces of iron, can be taught and
understood in the classroom; often, however, an employee’s skills will
fully flourish only within their professional context.34 As Aristotle
stated: “For the things which we have to learn before we can do them,
we learn by doing.”35 Further, from an employer’s perspective, a
business will often not realize the full value of an employee until she
learns the employer’s methods, techniques, and systems. In those
situations, formal training is only a jumping-off point. On-the-job

31. See, e.g., Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, 112 Stat. 936
(codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
32. Id. In its statement of purpose, the Workforce Investment Act proclaims the following:
The purpose of this subchapter is to provide workforce investment activities, through
statewide and local workforce investment systems, that increase the employment,
retention, and earnings of participants, and increase occupational skill attainment by
participants, and, as a result, improve the quality of the workforce, reduce welfare
dependency, and enhance the productivity and competitiveness of the Nation.
29 U.S.C. § 2811 (2000).
33. Gary Becker argues that employer investment in training is, in actuality, an employee
investment, since the employee presumably agrees to a lower salary in payment for the acquired
skills. GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 33–51 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing specific and general
training of employees by their employers).
34. Daron Acemoglu & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor
Markets, 109 ECON. J. 112 (Feb. 1999) (noting the advantages of investment in workplace
training instead of general education, because on-the-job training allows employers to target
specific skill sets required to keep the business on pace with technological progress).
35. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 34 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962).
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training furthers education by merging classroom study with realworld experience.
Employer investment in such training can take many forms:
proprietary training curricula built by the employer specifically for its
employees, funding commitments for employees to attend classes
taught by a third party, and informal apprenticeship programs are
36
examples of a few of the more common methods. To meet the
financial demands of training and retaining an adequate workforce,
an employer must allocate an enormous portion of its annual budget
to employee development. According to one report, American
companies spend more money on education than do all the public
37
school systems in the United States.
Further, once an employer has paid for training, an employee
forever retains monopoly power over his skills, which can be used to
38
obtain additional compensation from competing businesses. Much
like any other investment, employers will invest in training only if
they can recoup that investment by exploiting the skills of those who
receive the training.39 In that sense, human capital is indistinct from
nonhuman capital: employers “weigh the costs of investments made
in worker skills against the stream of benefits they expect from having
more skilled employees.”40 If the costs of investment are enlarged by
the risk that an employee can receive the training without any
contract or commitment to remain with the employer long enough to
provide an investment return, an employer’s incentive to invest
optimally in training diminishes.41 This risk is heightened if an

36. In-house training has become less common as companies struggle to assess what skills
are required in an ever-changing economy. CAPPELLI, supra note 1, at 198–220. Rather, as new
degree-specific schools like the University of Phoenix grow in popularity, employers find it
more cost effective to outsource training to third parties. In those cases, employers might pay
for training in a specific discipline with hopes of building a narrower knowledge base within the
company. By Cappelli’s account, 72 percent of the University of Phoenix’s tuition revenue is
derived from employers subsidizing their employees’ schooling. Id. at 209.
37. David Lange, Guest Commentary, Training Programs Should Be Seen as Investment,
Not Expense, NASHVILLE BUS. J., Sept. 15, 2003, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/
nashville/stories/2003/09/15/smallb5.html?t=printable.
38. See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383,
392–93 (1993) (discussing the risk of employer investment in training if long-term employment
contracts are not upheld).
39. CAPPELLI, supra note 1, at 46.
40. Id.
41. The growing number of opportunities awaiting those who choose to leave their
employer after being trained exacerbates this problem. See id. at 182–87 (providing examples of
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employee has the opportunity not only to leave with skills that the
employer subsidized, but also to use those skills against the employer
42
by working for a competitor business.
Other rationales also support the need to protect investment in
training. A lack of protection against employee mobility acts as a
“double hit” to the employer, which not only loses its monetary
investment in developing the employee’s skill set but also sacrifices
potential market advantage to the competitor who is able to enlist the
recently departed employee.43 Making matters worse is that the loss of
trained employees leaves the employer with no residual interest,
unlike many traditional forms of business investment. The free-rider
principle provides an additional rationale: if the employer has no way
to protect its investment, competitors reluctant to invest in training
can recruit well-trained employees without having to assume the cost
of the training.
Thus, employers seeking to recruit top talent and stay
competitive within today’s workforce have a significant interest in
protecting their investments in training. As discussed in Part III,
traditional noncompetes are an ineffective means of doing so, and
better alternatives, such as repayment agreements, exist. But to
appreciate these alternatives, one must first understand the
traditional rationales for noncompetes, the current state of
noncompete law, and how regularly courts have enforced
noncompetes to protect an employer’s training investment.
II. NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS
A. Public Policy Rationales
Numerous public policy considerations have led to divergent
opinions regarding the degree to which a noncompete clause between
an employer and an employee should be upheld. For instance, some
courts have found that freedom of contract principles support

the widespread use of “golden handcuffs” and signing bonuses as methods of poaching top
talent away from competing businesses).
42. See Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A
Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR.
L. REV. 1163, 1203–04 (2001) (“[D]espite the strategic importance of cultivating internal talent,
employers may not make such investments for fear that their efforts will merely aid the
competition.”).
43. Id.
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enforcing all contracts made between competent parties, so long as
44
those contracts are neither illegal nor unconscionable. Noncompete
agreements between employer and employee, it has been argued, fall
45
under this general rule. Noncompete advocates also argue that
restrictions are necessary to subvert attempts by rogue employees to
poach trade secrets and customer lists, which could be used to gain
46
advantage over former employers. This seems to follow naturally
from the contention that an employer reserves a right to protect
investment in its own business.47
If noncompetes are not enforced, employers will lack the
incentive to spend money creating trade secrets and customer lists.48
Such investment furthers business goals, creates competition, and
contributes to the overall welfare of the economy. Some proponents
of strict enforcement go even further and argue that an employer
should have a right to use noncompetes to protect any investment in
its business, including employee training.49 Recognizing the significant
outlay in training costs, those proponents support the protection of
training investment should the beneficiary of the training terminate
employment.50

44. See, e.g., UniCredito Italiano SPA v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 288 F. Supp. 2d 485, 499
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Sophisticated parties . . . are held to the terms of their contracts.”); Wiard v.
Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp., 79 P.3d 281, 285 (Mont. 2003) (“[T]he parties to a contract may
agree to anything that is not illegal, criminal, or immoral . . . .”). But see Maureen B. Callahan,
Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 704
(1985) (suggesting that although American law generally upholds agreements arrived at by
competent parties, post-employment restraints do not share this presumption of validity).
45. See Stone, supra note 13, at 740 (“When an employment relationship includes a
covenant not to compete . . . it is reasonable to assume that the employee has consented to
restrictions on his or her post-employment activities. Accordingly, there is a strong argument for
courts to enforce the covenant . . . .”).
46. See, e.g., Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 170 (5th Cir. 1969)
(“Although covenants not to compete are proper to protect trade secrets they may also be valid
simply to prevent a former employee’s using his expertise against his former employer.”); see
also Blake, supra note 2, at 627 (“From the point of view of the employer, postemployment
restraints are regarded as perhaps the only effective method of preventing unscrupulous
competitors or employees from appropriating valuable trade information and customer
relationships for their own benefit.”).
47. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 42, at 1170 (“[N]oncompetes can be seen as legal tools
necessary to preserve key business interests and relationships.”).
48. See Blake, supra note 2, at 627 (suggesting that employers might require covenants to
protect investment in research and development).
49. See infra Part III.A.
50. See infra Part III.A.
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On the other hand, those decrying employment noncompetes
51
generally advance four policy rationales. First, some scholars have
expressed concern that restrictive covenants are anticompetitive.52 If
employees are hindered from moving laterally between companies,
firms can tie up valuable human capital and create a monopoly on
market talent.53 According to Professor Harlan Blake, noncompetes
“diminish competition by intimidating potential competitors and by
54
slowing down the dissemination of ideas, processes, and methods.”
Second, opponents have criticized noncompetes for hindering a
worker’s ability to earn a living. Geographic and durational
noncompetes, if enforced, could limit an employee’s ability to take
55
advantage of her talents and provide sustenance for her family. To
the same extent that an employer might be reluctant to invest in
employee training if employment noncompetes were unenforceable,
an employee who values job transferability might be ambivalent to
general job training if a restrictive covenant obstructed that employee
from utilizing the newly acquired knowledge outside of her current
employment. Such a result could stunt the development of the
American workforce.56
The final two primary policy considerations are invoked less
frequently. Some courts have rejected noncompetes that allow
employers to take advantage of superior bargaining positions to the
57
detriment of their employees. Assuming a paternalistic role, courts

51. Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 348–50 (Ch. 1711). See generally Callahan, supra
note 44 (arguing that the “restraint-of-trade” rationale, the “employee-protection” rationale,
and the “loss-to-society” rationale do not sufficiently warrant unenforceability of noncompetes).
52. Blake, supra note 2, at 627.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., ABC v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 368 (N.Y. 1981) (recognizing that despite a
“strict approach to enforcement of . . . covenants,” public policy mandates skepticism toward
restrictions “impairing the employee’s ability to earn a living or the general competitive mold of
society”); All-Pak, Inc. v. Johnston, 694 A.2d 347, 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (“[I]n determining
whether to enforce a post-employment restrictive covenant, we must balance the interest the
employer seeks to protect against the important interest of the employee in being able to earn a
living in his chosen profession.”).
56. See Stone, supra note 13, at 722 (“Employees see the growth of their human capital and
the enhancement of their labor market opportunities as one of the benefits of the job.”); U.S.
Dep’t of Labor Plan, supra note 19, at 5 (“The fast pace of technological change will . . . require
that workers commit themselves to lifelong learning if [the] Nation’s workforce is to remain
competitive in the 21st Century.”).
57. See Schmidl v. Cent. Laundry & Supply Co., 13 N.Y.S.2d 817, 823 (Sup. Ct. 1939)
(recognizing a greater differential in bargaining power between employer and employee than
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that cite this rationale when striking down restrictions assume that
employers, given their in-house legal resources and experience, are
more sophisticated bargainers and likely to induce employees into
unnecessarily restrictive covenants. Lastly, some courts are reluctant
to enforce noncompetes that deprive the public of an employee’s
effort and productivity;58 described by one commentator as the “loss59
to-society” rationale, this line of reasoning is rare in today’s
60
jurisprudence.
B. Case Law
Given the complex policy considerations that are folded into the
analysis, it is no surprise that many states have been reluctant to
establish a consistent standard for analyzing noncompetition
agreements. The American case law in this area has been described
by one court as “a sea—vast and vacillating, overlapping and
bewildering.”61 Without consistent standards, courts have struggled to
find solid footing in a field of legal uncertainty.62 Often, courts use a
balancing test whereby the various policy considerations are weighed
to determine the outcome best attuned to the interests of the
employee, employer, and the general public.63 The focus of this test

between two corporate entities); Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 704
(Ohio 1952) (expressing concern that an employee’s bargaining disadvantage could produce “a
rash, improvident promise”). But see Hilb, Rogal, & Hamilton Agency of Dayton v. Reynolds,
610 N.E.2d 1102, 1107 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (“While an employment relationship may by
definition result in an employer having a slightly better bargaining position than an employee,
this disparity in bargaining power is inherent in the relationship and is not sufficient to render a
contract unenforceable absent a showing of [abuse].”).
58. See, e.g., Tarr v. Stearman, 105 N.E. 957, 961 (Ill. 1914) (finding the interests of the
public to be “paramount,” and stressing concern for not just “the financial profits to be made
from trades or professions, but the convenience of the public as well”).
59. Callahan, supra note 44, at 712.
60. See Blake, supra note 2, at 686 (recognizing that the courts usually look at the burden
on the employee and “almost never” consider the injury to society separately); Callahan, supra
note 44, at 706 (“[T]hough [the ‘loss to society’ rationale] is not much relied upon today, these
agreements were once considered a threat to the economy because they could remove a
productive person from the work force.”).
61. Arthur Murray Dance Studios, 105 N.E.2d at 687.
62. See Tamara Loomis, Non-Compete Pacts: Whether These Agreements Hold Up Is
Uncertain, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 24, 2000, at 6 (“At the end of the day, however, the one thing that is
certain with a non-compete agreement is that nothing is certain.”).
63. See Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co. [sic], 994 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Ark. 1999)
(“We review cases involving covenants not to compete on a case-by-case basis.”); 42 AM. JUR.
2D Injunctions § 138 (2003) (“A court may look at the equities on both sides in deciding whether
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becomes the reasonableness of the restraint, considering the needs of
64
both employee and employer. This case-by-case approach not only
provides little guidance for future court proceedings, it also hinders
the employer’s ability to predict which contracts are likely to be
upheld in court.65 Such uncertainty results in a vast amount of
litigation over the validity of noncompete agreements,66 adding
another cost to an already-expensive employer investment in human
67
capital.
The degree to which states will enforce noncompetes varies. On
one end, a few states favor a rejection of all restraints of trade,
leaving room for only a handful of noncompetes that are so narrowly
defined as to have a negligible effect on the employee’s right to
68
practice his trade. On the other end, Judge Richard Posner has
to issue an injunction prohibiting a former employee from competing with his or her former
employer . . . .”).
64. See, e.g., All Stainless Inc. v. Colby, 308 N.E.2d 481, 485 (Mass. 1974) (determining
enforceability by weighing “the reasonable needs of the former employer . . . against both the
reasonableness of the restraint imposed on the former employee and the public interest”).
65. See Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment
Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483, 485 (1990) (“[I]t still is difficult for lawyers to predict confidently
how a court will react to any given noncompetition clause.”); Greg T. Lembrich, Note, Garden
Leave: A Possible Solution to the Uncertain Enforceability of Restrictive Employment Covenants,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 2291, 2303 (2002) (“The lack of consistency that courts have demonstrated
in deciding these cases has led to an atmosphere of uncertainty, which may help to explain why
lawyers find it very difficult to advise clients.”).
66. See Whitmore, supra note 65, at 485 (“[T]he ambiguity surrounding the enforceability
of these clauses has resulted in vast amounts of litigation and reported appellate decisions.”)
67. One factor often undervalued in the determination of noncompete enforceability is the
degree to which employer investment must be protected. Put simply, the greater the cost of an
investment, the higher the return an employer expects. See infra Part III.B. Employer incentive
to train employees hinges on seeing a return on that investment. See supra Part I. Likewise,
employer incentive to establish noncompetes is directly related to the ability to enforce them
without costly litigation. Given the difficulty in balancing each of the given policy considerations
and the unpredictability of judicial enforcement, this Note stipulates that the employer must
assume greater responsibility in ensuring the validity of its noncompetes. See infra Part III.B.
One type of noncompete that might be more consistently upheld, advocated herein as an
alternative to traditional noncompetes, is the post-employment repayment agreement, discussed
infra Part III.B.
68. California law, for instance, stipulates that “every contract by which anyone is
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997). California courts have interpreted this
statute to accept not even “reasonable” restraints of trade. See, e.g., Metro Traffic Control v.
Shadow Traffic Network, 22 Cal. App. 4th 853, 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (“Section 16600 has
specifically been held to invalidate employment contracts which prohibit an employee from
working for a competitor when the employment has terminated, unless necessary to protect the
employer’s trade secrets.”). Courts will, however, allow a very limited exception if the employee
is “barred from pursuing only a small or limited part of the business, trade or profession.” IBM
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advocated per se enforceability of noncompetes subject only to the
69
traditional doctrines of fraud, duress, or unconscionability. Further,
many states even allow a “blue pencil” test, whereby portions of the
employment contract deemed too restrictive may be removed from
the agreement, leaving the rest of the noncompete enforceable.70
Despite some inconsistency between states, common
frameworks have emerged to settle issues of enforceability. As
previously described, most courts are wary of upholding contracts
71
that restrict an individual’s right to pursue a trade. In addition,
although many courts disfavor noncompetes,72 some courts find
v. Bajorek, 191 F.3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Campbell v. Bd. of Trs. of The Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 817 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1987)). Other states, such as Alabama and
North Dakota, have devised similar statutory prohibitions of noncompetes. ALA. CODE § 8-11(a) (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1987) (voiding noncompetes, and making statutory
exceptions only for the sale of a business or the dissolution of a partnership).
69. See Outsource Int’l., Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 670–71 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (advocating widespread enforcement of noncompetes and the application of a
reasonableness test only to address questions of fraud, duress, or unconscionability); see also
Eraser Co. v. Kaufman, 138 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750–51 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (“Negative covenants in
employment contracts are not presumptively invalid and will be enforced in the absence of
proof that they are unconscionable, inequitable, or in contravention of public policy.”);
Callahan, supra note 44, at 725 (“[T]he doctrine of unconscionability provides an appropriately
limited mechanism for protecting employees in those narrow circumstances where judicial
scrutiny of contracts is actually justified.”).
70. The “blue pencil” test has been applied in a few variations. Some courts take a
restrictive approach by removing only the unreasonable provisions of a contract that are easily
severable from the valid provisions. See, e.g., Hahn v. Drees, Perugini & Co., 581 N.E.2d 457,
461–62 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (eliminating an easily removable phrase that suggested an
employee would not be allowed to deal with clients obtained prior to his employment);
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 667, 683 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (reserving the
right to remove overly broad restrictions from the terms of a contract when doing so does not
expand the original language of the agreement). More commonly, modern courts exercise
greater freedom to modify or rewrite unreasonable provisions that are unenforceable as written.
See, e.g., Nestle Food Co. v. Miller, 836 F. Supp. 69, 78 (D.R.I. 1993) (applying Rhode Island’s
“rule of partial enforcement” to modify the terms of a noncompete when necessary to protect
the employer’s interests).
71. Courts are generally more likely to uphold noncompetes for sale of businesses than for
employment contracts. In the former situation, a noncompete will restrict the seller of a business
from competing with the buyer for a particular duration after the sale is consummated. The
sales price of a business will include the value of that business’ goodwill. Serena L. Kafker,
Golden Handcuffs: Enforceability of Noncompetition Clauses in Professional Partnership
Agreements of Accountants, Physicians, and Attorneys, 31 AM. BUS. L. J. 31, 33 (1993).
72. See, e.g., Amex Distrib. Co. v. Mascari, 724 P.2d 596, 600 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986)
(“Restrictive covenants which tend to prevent an employee from pursuing a similar vocation
after termination of employment are disfavored.”); Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 548
S.E.2d 207, 209 (S.C. 2001) (“[C]ovenants will be critically examined and construed against the
employer.”); Modern Env’ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 561 S.E.2d 694, 695 (Va. 2002) (“[C]ovenants in
restraint of trade are not favored, will be strictly construed, and, in the event of an ambiguity,
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that policy interests warrant enforceability under certain
73
circumstances.
In assessing such circumstances, courts commonly use a two-part
74
test to delineate between enforceable and unenforceable provisions.
First, noncompetes are permitted when the employer can
demonstrate that the contract is necessary to protect an employer’s
legitimate business interests.75 If the employer establishes a
protectable interest, the noncompete will become presumptively
76
enforceable and the burden will shift to the employee. Second, to
overcome this presumption and void the contract, the employee must
show that the agreement is unreasonable in its scope, geographic
boundaries, or duration, or that it is particularly injurious to the
interests of the general public.77 If these unreasonableness factors
sufficiently outweigh the employer’s protectable interests, the
78
noncompete will be voided.
This reasonableness test generally involves weighing the need to
protect the employer’s business against the agreement’s oppressive
79
effects on the employee. Excessive geographic and time restrictions

will be construed in favor of the employee.”); see also Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants,
Employee Training, and the Limits of Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 54 (2001) (“As
a presumptive matter, contracts restricting postemployment employee mobility are
unenforceable at common law.”).
73. See supra notes 61–70.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981) characterizes this test as
follows:
(1) A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is ancillary to
an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade if
(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest,
or (b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the
likely injury to the public.
75. For examples of cases demonstrating this analysis, see Blake, supra note 2, at 651–84.
76. Id.
77. Though many scholars agree that the “loss-to-society” rationale is not favored by most
contemporary courts, at least a handful of cases have employed this policy argument when
determining the enforceability of restrictive covenants against physicians and dentists. See
Kafker, supra note 71, at 37–41 (discussing cases that anticipate the injury to society resulting
from enforceability of noncompetes against physicians and dentists). It is worth mentioning that
the public interest argument works both ways for these cases: courts might strike down a
noncompete for restricting a doctor’s ability to provide medical services to a particular region,
but conversely courts might uphold a noncompete that will distribute doctors to other areas of
the state. Id.
78. Blake, supra note 2, at 651–84.
79. Lester, supra note 72, at 54–57; see also, e.g., Availability Inc. v. Riley, 336 So. 2d 668,
669–70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (upholding a noncompete restricting an employee from
working within a one-hundred-mile radius when the employer conducted 85 percent of its
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80
are the factors that will most often result in unenforceability, but
provisions that unreasonably restrict an employee’s range of activities
may also be invalidated.81 Further considerations, such as whether the
82
employee was involuntarily discharged or whether the employee
provides a unique service to the business,83 may also factor into the
reasonableness calculus.
Questions arise over what types of employer interests are likely
to be protectable. Many commentators agree that the two interests
most in need of protection are trade secrets and customer lists.84 By
providing companies with trade secret protection, the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act helps companies to guard information that “derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to . . . other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”85
However, because the statute does not fully protect the employer
from disclosure,86 further protection, in the form of restrictive
covenants, is needed.

business within that radius and when the employee was “otherwise well able to support himself
and his family”); Iowa Glass Depot, Inc. v. Jindrich, 338 N.W.2d 376, 382 (Iowa 1983)
(“Proximity to customers is only one aspect. Other aspects, including the nature of the business
itself, accessibility to information peculiar to the employer’s business, and the nature of the
occupation which is restrained, must be considered along with matters of basic fairness.”).
80. For a general discussion of time, geography, and scope restrictions, see Blake, supra
note 2, at 674–84.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Ma & Pa, Inc. v. Kelly, 342 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Iowa 1984) (distinguishing the
discharge of an employee from an employee resignation and finding a “discharge [to be] a factor
opposing the grant of an injunction”).
83. Compare Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 70–72 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying New
York law to uphold a noncompete when the employer seeking enforcement demonstrated that
the employee had built unique relationships with a limited group of clients in the real estate title
insurance industry and that those clients had been developed at the employer’s expense) with
Vander Werf v. Zunica Realty Co., 208 N.E.2d 74, 77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965) (refusing injunctive
relief to an employer when there was “no showing by defendant that [the employer’s] methods
of doing business were original or unique”).
84. See, e.g., Lester, supra note 72, at 54–55.
85. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990).
86. Whereas the Trade Secrets Act merely provides a tort remedy for an employer once
trade secret disclosure occurs, a restrictive noncompete ideally prevents disclosure from
occurring in the first place. Also, if charges are brought against an employee for breach of trade
secret law, the employer risks disclosure of the protected asset in court. Lester, supra note 72, at
53. For these reasons, noncompetes “fill a gap where other legal and extra-legal mechanisms fall
short.” Id. For a general discussion of the need for noncompetes in trade secret law, see id. at
52–53.
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Similarly, courts have been willing to uphold noncompetes that
protect an employer’s investment in procuring and maintaining client
87
relationships. Sales-intensive businesses, like technology consulting
or insurance companies, are driven by customer relationships; such
businesses often spend huge sums of money to develop these
relationships. By one account, costs of customer relationship
management software, commonly used by businesses to track contact
with customers and analyze purchasing patterns, can range from
several thousand dollars for a basic system to $50,000 per salesperson
for more sophisticated products.88 Because of this significant
investment in developing customer data, employers do not want
salespeople to depart with clients that the company spent significant
money to develop. Otherwise, companies have little incentive to
invest at the outset. Accepting this rationale, courts have upheld
covenants narrowly drawn to protect investments in customer data.89
Despite courts’ general willingness to protect employer
investment in trade secrets and customer lists, a more controversial
question is whether judges should protect employer investment in
employee training. Most courts see investment in training as an
employee expense, not an employer cost, the judicial protection of
which is not a legitimate concern.90 A small minority of courts allows
companies to protect investments in training, if the protection is
narrowly constructed.91 The remainder of this Note addresses the
issue of noncompetes as an effective means of protecting employer

87. The misappropriation of customer lists generated for both sales of services, such as
accounting or consulting companies, and sales of fungible goods have been deemed as
“protectable interests.” See, e.g., Farr Assoc., Inc. v. Baskin, 530 S.E.2d 878, 881 (N.C. Ct. App.
2000) (finding that a behavioral consulting firm had a protectable interest in limiting the risk of
client misappropriation by a consultant-employee when “work require[d] that its Consultants
develop an intimate relationship with its clients”); Arnow-Richman, supra note 42, at 1176 n.40
(“Cases which are particularly convincing to courts are those in which the product sold is
fungible or where it is easy for the customer to mistake the sales person with the actual
employer.”).
88. See Erika Morphy, The Real Cost of CRM, NEWSFACTOR TECHNOLOGY NEWS
(Oct. 29, 2001) (“[P]er-seat costs for high-complexity projects that have 1,000 users start at
around US$50,000 and slowly drop to about $15,000 as the number of users increases to 5,000.”)
at http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story_id=14447 (on file with the Duke Law Journal);
Emma Nash, The High Cost of CRM, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Aug. 17, 2001) (describing the
rising cost of CRM software) at http://www.computerweekly.com/Article105058.htm (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
89. See supra note 87.
90. See infra Part III.A.
91. See infra Part III.A.
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investment in training and questions whether repayment agreements
provide a more suitable alternative.
III. NONCOMPETES VS. REPAYMENT AGREEMENTS
With employers hard-pressed to protect their investments in
training, they often look to noncompete agreements as a means of
protection. However, the area of noncompete law is in a constant
state of flux; states, continually reevaluating their noncompete laws,
play a perennial game of “catchup” as market conditions
revolutionize employment patterns and practices. This environment
has resulted in employer confusion in predicting whether covenants
will be upheld and court frustration at having to constantly revise
employment law doctrine.92 Repayment agreements offer a less risky,
and more suitable, method for protecting employer training
investment.
A. Traditional Noncompetes Are Unsuitable Protection Against
Training Investment Loss
The increasing volume of employee training suggests that
employers will continue to use noncompete agreements as a way to
protect their training investments. However, courts have historically
disfavored covenants designed solely to protect an employer’s
investment in training.93 A survey of 105 noncompete cases did not
even find the employer’s investment in training significant enough to
warrant discussion.94 Although some contemporary courts have
occasionally held these investments to be protectable when the cost is

92. See CAPPELLI, supra note 1, at 1–16.
93. See, e.g., USAchem, Inc. v. Goldstein, 512 F.2d 163, 167 n.4 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[T]he fact
that a former employee was trained by the employer is not a basis for granting an injunction
enforcing a restrictive covenant.”); Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Maleki, 765 F. Supp. 402, 407 (E.D.
Mich. 1991), vacated, 889 F. Supp. 1583 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that “whatever expertise
defendant developed as a computer programmer at Kelsey-Hayes, with the assistance of on-thejob instruction and published manuals, has been his alone, historically, and would not fall within
the proscription of contracts protecting an employer’s propriety or confidential information”);
Clark Paper & Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher, 140 N.E. 708, 711–12 (N.Y. 1923) (refusing to protect an
employer’s investment in the general training of a wrapping paper salesperson); Kidde Sales &
Serv., Inc. v. Peairson, 493 S.W.2d 326, 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (stating the court’s
unwillingness to enforce noncompetes to protect training “even if the training was complex and
extensive”).
94. Stone, supra note 13, at 751 (citing Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of
Noncompetition Clauses in Employment Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483, 524–25 & n.243 (1990)).
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95

significant, courts generally have not accorded investment in training
the same “protectable” status granted to trade secrets and customer
lists.96
This has left scholars to debate whether investment in training
should be a protectable interest. Perhaps the most recognized theory
attacking covenants protecting employer investment in training is
Professor Gary Becker’s human capital model.97 Becker begins with
the premise that two distinct types of training exist: general training,
98
which increases an employee’s marketability to many firms, and
specific training, which enhances an employee’s value only to the firm
providing the training.99 According to Becker’s model, neither of

95. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Protective Serv. Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495,
501 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (finding a private security firm’s investment in fire safety and security
training videos for guards, an eighty-hour on-the-job formal training course, and time off for
guards to grow accustomed to a new client site, taken together, rose to the level of a judicially
protectable interest).
An interesting comparison can be made between the need to protect an investment in
training, as has been discussed throughout this article, and the protection of an investment in
public image. In the case of Beckman v. Cox Broad. Corp., 296 S.E.2d 566 (Ga. 1982), the
Georgia Supreme Court upheld a noncompete restricting a news meteorologist from competing
“on air” against his employer for six months after the employment period ended. Id. at 569. In
reaching its decision, the court observed the significant investment of $750,000 made by the
employer news station to develop and promote the weatherman’s public persona. Id. at 567, n.2.
The employer argued that the publicity generated through the promotional campaign enhanced
the weatherman’s image, making him more marketable to competing news stations and
eradicating the employer’s investment. Id. at 569. Much like human capital of skills and
aptitude, the court recognized the weatherman’s ownership of his own image and personality
created by the employer’s promotion; the employee was free to take the investment with him to
his new employer. Id. at 569. However, the court also found that the news station’s interest in
protecting its investment in the weatherman’s image outweighed the cost imposed upon the
weatherman by the noncompete. Id. This case merely serves as a reminder that the analysis
presented can be applied across a broad cross section of fact patterns relating to employer
investment.
96. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 42, at 1192–93 (“Since the proper inquiry is whether
confidential information has been transmitted, it has been held that even where the employer
expends funds to support formalized training, such expenditures are insufficient to support a
noncompete if the employee gains only generalized knowledge or experience.”); Lester, supra
note 72, at 57 (“Even where an employer can demonstrate costly training expenditures, a court
is unlikely to enforce a covenant to protect them absent the additional presence of trade secrets,
confidential information, or protectible client relationships.”).
97. BECKER, supra note 33, at 33–51.
98. Id. at 33.
99. Id.
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these training investments should be protectable through
100
noncompetes.
With regard to general training, Becker argues, employers are
unwilling to invest in general training when an employee can leave
with newly acquired skills and earn a higher salary from a competing
business that is not financially burdened with sponsoring the
101
training. Thus, in a perfectly competitive market, firms pay less to
employees who receive general training, since every dollar that the
employer spends on training is one less dollar that the employer will
pay in salary.102 The cost of in-house training, then, is actually imputed
to the employee, who will earn a lower salary while receiving the
training but pocket the future wage potential resulting from the
improved skill set.103 Because the employer has no investment to
protect, Becker argues, there is no need for a noncompete
104
agreement.
Unlike general training, Becker argues, the investment in specific
105
training is shared by the employer and the employee. Since this
firm-specific training is useful only to the employer who provides it,106
the employee presumably values it less than general training.107 Given
that “no rational employee would pay for training that did not benefit
108
him,” the employer must assume at least some of the cost of specific
training.109 But even if a firm were to pay for all of the specific
training, an employee might still quit after the investment has been

100. See id. at 46 (arguing that investments in specific training lost when employees leave
do not accrue to new employers); id at 40 (“The property right of the worker in his skills is the
source of his incentive to invest in [general] training by accepting a reduced wage during the
training period and explains why an analogy with unowned innovations is misleading.”).
101. Id. at 34.
102. See id. at 34 (“Hence it is the trainees, not the firms, who bear the cost of general
training and profit from the return.”).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 40. To observe how this theory plays out within a “real world” hypothetical, see
Lester, supra note 72, at 62–63.
105. Establishing the difficulty in drawing lines between specific and general training,
Becker points out that “[m]uch on-the-job training is neither completely specific nor completely
general but increases productivity more in the firms providing it and falls within the definition
of specific training.” BECKER, supra note 33, at 40.
106. Examples of firm-specific training might include education in how to use a firm’s
proprietary software, follow operating procedures, or sell the firm’s products or services.
107. BECKER, supra note 33, at 40–42.
108. Id. at 42.
109. Id.
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110
made. Thus, to protect the employer against the risk of loss, an
employee is forced to accept a somewhat reduced salary to share in
the cost of the specific training.111 By sharing the cost, “[e]mployees
with specific training have less incentive to quit, and firms have less
112
incentive to fire them.” This conclusion obviates any need for a
noncompete agreement because the employee investment in training
binds him to the employer until the employee recoups his
investment.113
Numerous revisions and criticisms have been asserted against the
Becker model. Professors Paul Rubin and Peter Shedd point out that
a different type of general training, namely, that which involves a
combination of skill development and trade secrets, can be imparted
to the employee in a short amount of time but is more expensive than
what the employee is able to self-finance up-front through wage
114
concessions. The difference between what the employee will pay
and what the training is worth must be supplemented by the
employer. However, encouraging an employer to invest in this kind of
general training might require a restrictive covenant.115 Since courts
are likely to have difficulty distinguishing between this general
training and the type that only involves skill development,116
Professors Rubin and Shedd conclude that the courts’ current system
117
of protecting only trade secrets, not general training, is appropriate.
Other critics agree that some employee wage concessions are
disproportionate to, in the sense that they do not cover, the value of

110. Id. at 42–46.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 46.
113. See Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete,
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 96 (1981) (“If training is truly specific, the employer needs no assurance
that the worker will continue to work for him, for there is no other market in which the
employee can sell his skill.”).
114. Id. at 96–97.
115. Id. at 97–99.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 105–07.
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general training provided.118 Thus, firms often absorb costs for
investments in general training.119
Assuming these criticisms of Becker’s model are accurate and
that employers do invest in employee general training, many scholars
miss another important and rather fundamental argument for
unenforceability. Traditional noncompetes protecting training
investment restrict an employee from working for a competitor for a
defined duration after employment is terminated.120 Distinguished
from other, alternative noncompete agreements,121 traditional
noncompetes are generally intended to bind the employee throughout
the entire duration of employment. Nevertheless, at some point
during an employee’s tenure, the employer will earn back its
investment in training the employee.122 Under a traditional
noncompete, the employee will be bound from competing against the
employer even after the employer has safely recouped its investment.
Because an important justification for upholding a traditional
noncompete is to foster investment in training by helping employers
protect that investment, a noncompete barring an employee from
competing once the investment has been recovered seems patently
unfair. Put differently, traditional noncompete agreements provide a
windfall to the employer when they continue in force after the
training investment has been repaid.
Consider the following hypothetical. A technology consulting
firm decides to invest in developing a business division dedicated to
the sale and implementation of a newly released software program.
Before hiring and training employees to accommodate this new
business, the employer prepares a cost-benefit analysis to determine
the number of employees and amount of training necessary to earn a
118. See Acemoglu & Pischke, supra note 34, at 4 (alluding to studies that “do not find
lower wages for workers in training programs, and even when wages are lower, the amounts
typically appear too small to compensate firms for the loss”).
119. See id. at 5:
There are also many examples of firms that send their employees to college, MBA or
literacy programs, and problem-solving courses, and pay for the expenses while the
wages of workers who take up these benefits are not reduced. In addition, many large
companies, such as consulting firms, offer training programs to college graduates
involving general skills. These employers typically pay substantial salaries and bear
the full monetary costs of training, even during periods of full-time classroom
training.
120. See supra note 2.
121. These are discussed infra Part III.B.
122. This argument assumes training occurs in discrete periods, as opposed to continually
throughout the period of employment.
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profit. Part of this calculation might include the imposition of
noncompete agreements for each new hire, a guarantee that the
training investment would be protected if an employee leaves the
firm. Then, assume that an employee is hired and signs a two-year
noncompete agreement. Within the first month, the employer
finances $15,000 worth of training regarding the specifications of the
new software; this is a sizable amount and probably enough to make
the employee much more attractive to competing firms. Imagine,
however, that the employee decides not to take advantage of
opportunities elsewhere and instead remains with his employer,
implementing the software for five years, during which he receives
only minimal additional training. Presumably, the original investment
made by the employer has long been recompensed. Nonetheless,
under a traditional noncompete agreement, if the employee decided
to leave the firm he would still be bound against competing with his
employer for two years.123
Some might argue that courts inherently evaluate the
amortization of the training investment when assessing the validity of
124
a noncompete under the popular “reasonableness” calculation.
125
Indeed, a few courts have. However, many courts are reluctant to
look beyond scope, duration, and geography when assessing the
126
reasonableness of a noncompete. But, where the reasonableness
test would become frustratingly imprecise, an opportunity emerges
for employers to look for less conventional means of protecting their
investments. Put another way, given the degree of inconsistency in
U.S. noncompete jurisprudence, why would any employer choose to

123. This problem seems particularly troublesome in industries in which training is frontloaded in an employee’s career. Occupations that require sizable up-front training, with little
need for further training to keep pace with market needs, seem to be quite vulnerable to
restrictions imposed by traditional noncompetes. On the other hand, careers in which the
required employee skill sets are constantly evolving might have more of a demand for ongoing
training; for those careers, this problem seems less daunting.
124. RESTATEMENT, supra note 74, § 188.
125. See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d 593, 598 (La. 1974) (finding that
an employer expense of $261.50 to furnish one day of training in 1970 did not justify restricting
an employee from competing in 1973 and 1974, since “the employer had long received the
benefit of its investment through the employee’s two years of managerial service afterwards”).
126. See, e.g., Brunswick Floors, Inc. v. Guest, 506 S.E.2d 670, 672–73 (Ga. App. Ct. 1998)
(rejecting an employment contract on grounds that a noncompete restriction imposed
throughout an eighty-mile radius exceeded what was necessary to protect an employer’s
investment in a business training trip, but ignoring whether the amount spent on training had
been recovered over the course of the employee’s eighteen-month tenure after the training was
received); see also supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
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chance enforceability with a traditional noncompete when a more
judge-friendly alternative exists?
B. Repayment Agreements More Closely Align Training Investment
with Employers’ Need for Protection
Other forms of protection have found their way into
contemporary employment contracts as alternatives to the
uncertainty of traditional noncompetes. Repayment agreements,
which require employees to pay back training expenses if they quit
before the employer recoups its investment, have become
increasingly prevalent in employment contracts.127 This form of
noncompete can help employers establish proportionality between
128
their outlay in training and their restrictions on employees, making
them a formidable alternative to traditional noncompetes.
While cases involving repayment agreements are uncommon,129
perhaps because “[e]nforcement actions have not usually been
130
necessary,” courts adjudicating the validity of these agreements
have shown a willingness to enforce them.131 For example, in
Milwaukee Area Joint Apprenticeship v. Howell,132 a repayment clause
was upheld when it required an electrical apprentice to repay the cost
of his training to an apprentice training trust fund when he chose to

127. Anthony W. Kraus, Repayment Agreements for Employee Training Costs, 1993 LAB.
L.J. 49, 49 (1993). Further alternatives to noncompetes exist. Popular in Great Britain, “gardenleave” contracts require employees to provide employers with a specified period of notice prior
to departing, but in return employers agree to pay the employee’s salary during that time to
ensure that the employees do not compete. See, e.g., Lembrich, supra note 61, at 2314 (“Given
the uncertain enforceability of restrictive covenants in the United States and the success that
garden leave has enjoyed in England, it is not surprising that many American employers have
begun inserting garden leave clauses into the employment contracts of their key employees.”).
Another option advocated by some companies requires an employee to obtain a specified
degree or amount of training before being hired, shifting training costs to the employee.
CAPPELLI, supra note 1, at 204–05.
128. For a discussion of how repayment agreements are typically devised, see id. at 49–50.
129. Kraus, supra note 127, at 51 (“To date, very few cases appear to have considered
training cost repayment agreements under restrictive covenant law.”).
130. Id. at 50.
131. See, e.g., National Training Fund v. Maddux, 751 F. Supp. 120, 121–22 (S.D. Tex. 1990)
(requiring an employee to repay the cost of training after acquiring a new skill at his employer’s
expense); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2)(c) (West 2003) (enforcing noncompetes
that “provid[e] for recovery of the expense of educating and training an employee who has
served an employer for a period of less than two years”).
132. 67 F.3d 1333 (7th Cir. 1995).
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133
work for an employer that did not contribute to the fund. Though
rarely the source of litigation, repayment agreements designed merely
as penalties against the employee for the breach of a noncompete
134
have also found some judicial support.
There are limits to the judicial enforcement of repayment
135
agreements. In Brunner v. Hand Industries, Inc., an Indiana state
court refused to uphold a repayment agreement because it was
unreasonably restrictive.136 There, the employee had agreed to a
three-year repayment schedule, during which time the amount to be
repaid by the employee would increase with the amount of training
provided by the employer.137 The court judged the agreement invalid
because the employee potentially could have been liable for an
amount exceeding the total wages received throughout the
employment.138 Thus, the court seems not to have rejected the
repayment agreement per se but rather condemned the increasing
scale of repayment amounts used by the employer. Perhaps a more
modest system would have been enforced.139
Despite this limit, repayment agreements can serve as an
effective means of addressing the issue of amortized training costs.
Perhaps the strongest rationale supporting their use is the ease with
which they can be created. Before investing in training, employers
undoubtedly will have performed a cost-benefit analysis to assess the
profit potential from such an investment.140 In fact, back-end
computing software available to most companies facilitates this
process.141 Companies that use this type of software can also evaluate

133. Id. at 1335.
134. See, e.g., Dental East, P.C. v. Westercamp, 423 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Iowa App. 1988)
(enforcing a noncompete that required a payment penalty if the employee, a dentist, chose to
break the agreement for one year after termination); Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co., 572 A.2d
510, 525–26 (Md. 1990) (upholding a “fee equivalent remedy” that required an accountant to
repay his former partnership in the event that the partner competed within a prescribed
geographic area).
135. 603 N.E.2d 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
136. Id. at 161.
137. Id. at 158–59.
138. Id. at 161.
139. See Stone, supra note 13, at 755 (“[T]o be enforceable, a training repayment agreement
must be written narrowly.”).
140. See supra text accompanying note 39.
141. This holds especially true for companies that reserve significant budgets for training
expenses. Software products such as Oracle or Peoplesoft provide comprehensive financial
budgeting software that allows businesses to manage training expenses and forecast the
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how their human resources are generating revenue for the business
through the use of such training. In the consulting firm scenario
presented in Part III.A, the fictional employer might use Oracle
(database software) to track the number of hours the employee has
billed each month for the past five years, as well as the number of
those hours that leveraged the initial investment made in the
employee’s education. Thus, because the employer would have the
ability to compute the cost of training and the revenue generated
from that employee’s use of the training, the employer can also
determine when it has broken even. With this information, the
employer should be able to generate a repayment plan that accurately
predicts the amount to be repaid by the employee at each stage of his
employment should he choose to leave the firm. If designed properly,
the repayment amount at each step would reflect the break-even
point at which the employee’s repayment would fully compensate the
employer. Repayment agreements, therefore, more so than
traditional noncompetes, are an equitable means of making the
employer whole.
Admittedly, none of the aforementioned repayment cases deal
with the issue initially presented: that is, how repayment agreements
can be used to circumvent problems relating to the amortization of
training costs over the duration of employment. Some might argue
that the absence of legal precedent is a function of the relative
novelty of repayment agreements in an employment law context.
Perhaps as technology continues to become more readily available,
employers will take advantage of budgetary tools to experiment with
the form of future noncompetition agreements. Regardless, a number
of scholars have agreed that repayment agreements are building a
strong foundation in the field of employment law.142
In sum, repayment agreements provide a strong alternative to
traditional noncompetition agreements in that they inherently weigh
the value of training to the employee against the cost of training to
the employer. Though rarely litigated, these agreements seem to offer

feasibility of effective training. See Oracle, Oracle E-Business Suite, at http://www.oracle.com/
applications (last visited June 6, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
142. See Lester, supra note 72, at 76 (“I would share with a handful of other commentators
some optimism about a hybrid approach in which restrictive covenants are deemed
unenforceable by statute, with an explicit exception made for discrete training repayment
contracts.”); Stone, supra note 13, at 755–56 (arguing that the enforcement of a repayment
agreement, “unlike enforcement of a broad covenant not to compete, does not undermine [the]
psychological contract” between employer and employee).
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employers a better chance of enforceability because courts can more
closely evaluate the nexus between the dollars spent and the value
derived from an investment. To strengthen the case for enforceability,
it is wise for employers to remember that “the amount of any
repayment for the cost of training should be commensurate with its
actual original cost to the employer.”143 In doing so, the employer is
more likely to defeat any challenge brought on the ground that the
amortization of the training was not considered in the
“reasonableness” calculus.
CONCLUSION
Following in the footsteps of the Louisiana legislature, courts and
lawmakers will undoubtedly be confronting the question of whether
training deserves recognition as a protectable interest long into the
future. One analyst has noted that “[t]here are some early signs that
the long-standing judicial hostility to covenants may be on the
wane.”144 Until (or unless) this decrease in hostility actually occurs,
employers should find alternate methods of protecting their
investment in training. Judicial enforceability of noncompetition
agreements is a “crapshoot,” according to one New York
145
practitioner. With the need to stay competitive in a marketplace
ever-hungry for dynamic, well-trained employees, companies must
continue to invest in training; the onus must then fall on companies to
ensure that their investments will be protected. By anticipating
enforceability problems and designing alternatives that more closely
align company investment with employee tenure, employers can
increase the likelihood of convincing judges that training investments
warrant protection.

143. Kraus, supra note 127, at 51.
144. William R. Groth, Response to Gillian Lester and Steward J. Schwab: An Indiana
Perspective, 76 IND. L.J. 77, 78 (2001).
145. Loomis, supra note 62, at 5 (quoting David A. Weisberg, who was then a partner in the
now-defunct firm of Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP).

